ABSTRACT For three decades, sudden acceleration (SA) incidents have been reported, where automobiles accelerate without warning. These incidents are often diagnosed as no fault found. Investigators, who follow the line of diagnostic reasoning from the 1989 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) SA report, tend to conclude that SAs are caused by driver pedal error. This paper reviews the diagnostic process in the NHTSA report and finds that: 1) it assumes that an intermittent electronic malfunction should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests without saying why and 2) the consequence of this assumption, for which there appears to be no forensic precedent, is to recategorize possible intermittent electronic failures as proven to be nonelectronic. Showing that the supposedly inescapable conclusions of the NHTSA report concerning electronic malfunctions are without foundation opens the way for this paper to discuss electronic intermittency as a potential factor in SA incidents. It then reports a simple practical experiment that shows how mechanically induced electrical contact intermittencies can generate false speed signals that an automobile speed control system may accept as true and that do not trigger any diagnostic fault codes. Since the generation of accurate speed signals is essential for the proper functioning of a number of other automobile safety-critical control systems, the apparent ease with which false speed signals can be generated by vibration of a poor electrical contact is obviously a matter of general concern. Various ways of reducing the likelihood of SAs are discussed, including electrical contact improvements to reduce the likelihood of generating false speed signals, improved battery maintenance, and the incorporation of an independent fail-safe that reduces engine power in an emergency, such as a kill switch.
I. INTRODUCTION -THE BACKGROUND TO SUDDEN ACCELERATION INCIDENTS A. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF SUDDEN ACCELERATION INCIDENTS
Since the early 1980s numerous instances have been reported of automobiles allegedly suddenly accelerating. Sudden acceleration (SA) incidents fall into three main categories: 1) SA incidents from at or near standstill (Forward/ Reverse) 1 ; 2) SA incidents when vehicle is or has been movingspeed control not on; 3) SA incidents when vehicle is moving -speed control on. These three categories are further broken down in Appendix I. The majority of incidents fall into the first 1 A number of examples are detailed in Appendix II.
category and seem to occur when the vehicle is at or near standstill and Appendix II provides some examples.
Sudden acceleration (SA) incidents 2 appear to happen unexpectedly and in many cases drivers claim that they have been unable to regain control by braking. Serious injuries and death have sometimes resulted. There have been a number of cases where as a result of a SA incident, drivers have been prosecuted for vehicular homicide and have been sentenced lengthy prison sentences.
Criminal Courts In the USA have tended to accept prosecution arguments that if no physical evidence of a malfunction in the cruise control or electronic throttle can be found, the SA incident must have been caused by driver error. By such fallacious argument, the burden of proof is reversed, and the vehicle is assumed innocent unless proven guilty, rather than the driver.
The main source of SA statistics is the Complaints Database of the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) of the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 3 The US National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) in its 2011 Report on SA in Toyota vehicles [1] analysed all vehicle complaints received by NHTSA between 2000 and 2010 and concluded that 2.3% could be identified as SA incidents. This equated to a rate of about 1/100,000 vehicles per year for the USA. This statistic hides the fact that there is wide variation in complaint rate by vehicle model and model year [2] , [3] .
Generally speaking the likelihood of an individual driver experiencing a SA incident in his driving lifetime is very low. However, if he purchases a particular model manufactured in a particular model year he may find that the vehicle happens to be one of a batch where the incident rate is an order of magnitude greater than the rate quoted above. There are over 1,000 million automobiles in the world. A SA incident rate of 1/100,000 vehicle per year equates to 10,000 incidents in the world per year. There is therefore a significant public safety issue that needs to be addressed. But before effective preventive measures can be devised and put into practice, the contributory failure mechanisms must be identified, discussed and come to be understood. It is the purpose of this paper to contribute to this discussion process by focussing attention on the potential role of vibration-induced electrical intermittency as a possible contributory factor in SA incidents.
B. AN EXAMPLE OF A SUDDEN ACCELERATION INCIDENT CAUGHT ON VIDEO
An example of a SA incident from near standstill is recorded in the NHTSA ODI Complaints Database[ ODI 1049505] and was captured on high definition security cameras. The video clip included in this paper captures the period of 8 seconds before the start of the incident and two alternating SAs in forward and reverse directions during the subsequent 22.9 seconds before the vehicle came to a halt. 4 The aftermath of this incident is shown in Fig. 1 . The manufacturer, after inspecting the wrecked vehicle, downloading the EDR results and seeing the video, concluded that there was no evidence of a defect.
The 31 second video provides a detailed record of an entire low-speed sudden acceleration incident from which it was possible for the author of this paper to establish SA durations and impact speeds, as shown in Appendix III. When he compared the vehicle's speed calculated from the video with the claimed spot speeds downloaded from the Electronic Data Recorder (EDR), he found significant mismatches FIGURE 1. Aftermath of an alleged double sudden acceleration into a house captured on video. 5 Whole incident including 8.5 seconds before start of SA. Second view from start of SA finishing after end of incident. Third view from above front door with household response.
that could not be explained by measurement error or wheel slip:
• The EDR record, see Fig. A3 -3, claims to show that at 4.6 seconds before the initial impact in the first SA incident the vehicle was moving forwards at 12.4 mph. The video recording shows that at this time the vehicle was moving very slowly and in an apparently controlled manner and was just beginning to turn into the parking area. The video shows that the first SA incident began less than 2 seconds before the first impact with the right hand garage and not at least 4.6 seconds before impact as the EDR record claims.
• The EDR record claims an impact speed of 14.9 mph for the first impact with the right hand garage. The author has estimated from the video that the impact speed was between 7.4 and 9.3 mph (i.e. between 50% and 62% of what the EDR record claims).
• In the second SA incident, Fig. A3 -4, the EDR claims an impact speed of 22.4 mph with the left hand garage. The author has estimated from the video that the impact speed was approximately 12.7 mph. (i.e. approximately 57% of what the EDR record claims). The speeds calculated from the video appear to be significantly lower than the spot speeds obtained from the EDR data and these discrepancies should be borne in mind during the reading of this paper. How might such apparent speed discrepancies come about?
The video shows that the engine did not stall on vehicle impact with the either the right hand or left hand garage, but the wheels continued to rotate in the forward direction in a jerky manner until the moment when the vehicle was put into reverse and started accelerating backwards. In the author's opinion, this continued development of torque at the drive wheels after impact and the consequential wheel slippage is a result of the torque multiplication factor coming into effect. The torque multiplication effect, which is the equivalent to an extra low reduction gear approximately 2.5 times lower than bottom gear, is an inherent feature of the operation of an hydraulic coupling whenever there is a big speed differential between the engine rotating at high RPM on one side of the torque coupling and a stalled, or nearly stalled transmission, on the other. See Part II, Section B reference [11] .
C. SUDDEN ACCELERATION INCIDENTS ARE OFTEN DIAGNOSED 'NO FAULT FOUND'
When a car owner takes his vehicle to the dealer after experiencing an alleged SA incident, he may report that the vehicle seems to have behaved in a dangerous manner that is out of character. However, when the vehicle is examined there may be no signs of physical damage. When the diagnostic system is interrogated no fault codes may show up. The vehicle may appear to run perfectly satisfactorily in the workshop and nothing may show up on a test run. As a result, the vehicle may be returned to the owner diagnosed as 'no fault found' (NFF).
A NFF diagnosis by the dealer, or a statement from the manufacturer that there is no evidence of a defect, is of little comfort to an owner who has experienced the SA because he fears, with some justification, that the vehicle may now have the potential for a repeat SA incident at some time in the future. In one case [ODI 10201655 ], see Appendix IV, the driver recorded five alleged SA incidents in a few months. After the second incident, the dealer reported 'no fault found' (NFF) and after the third said 'We can't fix the problem until we can duplicate it'. The fifth SA incident resulted in a rollover and smash-up from which the driver was lucky to come out alive. It occurred on the journey to the garage for a diagnostic check-up following the fourth incident.
With an alleged SA incident, the lack of physical evidence and the frustrating inability to find fault codes, or reproduce to order, either in the workshop or a test run, mystifies and stymies many automobile investigators. These investigators come mainly from a mechanical engineering background, where faults tend to reveal themselves visibly on inspection. They find it difficult to come to grips with possible intermittent electronic system and software malfunctions that tend to leave no visible physical traces behind them and cannot readily be duplicated. In the author's opinion, the lack of evidence of physical damage should suggest the possibility of an intermittent electronic or software malfunction and the need for further investigation. 6 However, all too often manufacturers and dealers appear to use the fallacious and questionable 'absence of proof is proof of absence' argument to claim that the NFF provides positive proof that there could not have been an electronic malfunction. This tends to kick possible electronic and software malfunctions out of the field of reasonable discussion into the dead ground of faults supposedly 'proven' to be non-electronic.
Some investigators, quoting the conclusions of US Government SA reports discussed in Part I, Section D following, categorically rule out intermittent electronic/software malfunctions as a possible cause of SAs and feel justified in jumping to one of three alternative conclusions: the driver pressed the accelerator pedal when they meant to press the brake (pedal error hypothesis); the accelerator pedal stuck (sticky pedal hypothesis); a loose all-weather floor mat tangled with the accelerator pedal, or vice -versa (floor mat hypothesis). If there has been an accident, the EDR record is assumed to provide an accurate picture of accelerator pedal position, brake ON/OFF, vehicle speed and engine speed in the seconds just before the crash, when, as shown in Part 1 Section B, these values may be incorrect.
D. SUDDEN ACCELERATION INVESTIGATIONS -US GOVERNMENT REPORTS
A major obstacle to the discussion of electrical intermittency in relation to SA incidents is the claim, often repeated by the automobile industry and by NHTSA, that the 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report proves beyond all doubt that SA incidents were most probably the result of driver error. This collective mind-set appears to brook no argument and tends to kill stone-dead all reasoned discussion on the subject of electrical intermittency. To clear the ground for the discussion of electrical intermittency, the author of this paper digresses, in this Section and Section E that follows, in order to examine the diagnostic methodology of the NHTSA 1989 SA Report, question its assumptions and make plain what, in his opinion, is a manifest weakness in the 'pedal error hypothesis' that forms the raison d'être of the report. He makes no apology for what he feels to be a very necessary digression.
During the 1980s there were many SA incidents in different makes of vehicles, and NHTSA, after much prodding, undertook a study that culminated in the 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration report [4] . This report listed at the beginning nine 'logical assumptions' that it used 'as the basis for the design of experiments and analyses'. The eighth assumption, which is by far the most important, still remains the basis of diagnostic testing for 'intermittent electronic failures' that might cause an SA to this day:
''If the cause of an SAI is an intermittent electronic failure, physical evidence may be difficult to find, but the failure mode should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests.' ' '7 The report claims that this assumption is logical, but it fails to declare the foundation for that claim. Why, and accordance with what diagnostic or forensic principles, should an intermittent electronic failure be defined as necessarily having 7 SA NFFs cannot pass the NHTSA's reproducibility test, ergo in NHTSA's terms, they do not exist, and are therefore arbitrarily re-categorized by default as not having been caused by intermittent electronic failures. In the opinion of the author, what appears to be the arbitrary introduction of 'reproducibility' by NHTSA as the proof for intermittency defines most suspected electronic intermittencies out of existence. However, cleverly camouflaging the elephant does not remove it from the room. Nor does defining potential intermittent electronic failures out of existence by the exercise of linguistic gymnastics stop SA incidents from occurring.
Having made reproducibility the litmus test for intermittent electronic failures and finding that sudden acceleration incidents can only very rarely be reproduced, the 1989 NHTSA Report concluded that:
''For SAI in which there is no evidence of throttle sticking or cruise-control malfunction, the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the driver pressing the accelerator instead of, or in addition to, the brake pedal'' This supposedly 'inescapable conclusion' of 'pedal error' is frequently cited as the authority for claiming that driver error is the 'proven' cause of sudden accelerations. However, H. Qi et al [6] 8 Reproducibility is the ability of an entire experiment or study to be reproduced and is one of the main principles of the scientific method. To be able to reproduce an experiment, a necessary precondition is that the initial experiment is fully described. The problem with applying the methodology willy-nilly as a test for SA is that the factors at play in the original incident may well not be known and the values of key variables at the start of the incident and during the incident will not all have been measured. Nevertheless some vehicles in which SA incidents have occurred, ODI 1049505 for example, do seem to have had the capability to reproduce SAs a number of times. One might have thought that a proven capability of a particular alleged SA to reproduce itself would be treated by automobile manufacturers and NHTSA as worthy of very special investigation, but there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case.
comprehensive cause and effect diagram can help identify all the possible causes for a field failure.''
After the 1989 NHTSA report, SA incidents continued to be reported. Various individuals attempted to get NHTSA to reopen the investigations that they had terminated in 1989, but to no avail [7] , [8] . So it continued until the Saylor accident in August 2009 9 when it emerged that thousands of Toyota and Lexus owners driving vehicles fitted with electronic throttles had also experienced SA incidents. In March 2010, following Congressional hearings on SA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was commissioned by NHTSA to investigate Toyota vehicles fitted with electronic throttles. The NASA report was published ten months later in February 2011 [1] Here the NASA investigators were working on the basis that 'absence of proof is not proof of absence', as would other competent engineers and scientists engaged in any similar investigation. However, at the press conference when this report was released, the then US Secretary of State for Transport Ray La Hood said forcefully, and to the contrary:
''We enlisted the best and brightest engineers to study Toyota's electronics systems, and the verdict is in. There is no electronic-based cause for unintended high-speed acceleration in Toyotas. Period [9] .'' Since then, automobile manufacturers have been able to shelter behind what Secretary of State La Hood claimed that the 2011NASA report said and have used the governmental absolution of Toyota electronics to hallmark the 'inescapable conclusion' of the 1989 NHTSA report that SAs '. . . .definitely involve the driver pressing the accelerator instead of, or in addition to, the brake pedal. ' As has been shown earlier in this section, the conclusions of the 1989 NHTSA Report follow directly from the initial assumption that an intermittent electronic failure 'should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests'. The entire pedal error hypothesis appears to stand or fall on the validity of this assumption of 'reproducibility'.
However, the pedal error hypothesis itself turns out to have an internal weakness, in the form of another hidden assumption that, to the best of the author's knowledge, has not previously been identified and which, once acknowledged, de-camouflages the electronic elephant in the room once and for all, as will become apparent in Section E that follows.
E. THE NHTSA PEDAL ERROR HYPOTHESIS AND THE CONCEPT OF 'DRIVER STARTLEMENT'
The NHTSA 1989 Sudden Acceleration report distils the essence of the pedal error hypothesis into a single diagram, Fig. 2 . According to the pedal error hypothesis, as expounded by NHTSA, the driver is ''startled'' into trying to make an emergency stop and floors the accelerator pedal by mistake and then continues to depress the pedal in the belief that he has his foot on the brake. This hypothetical mistaken action causes the throttle to open and initiates a sustained sudden acceleration.
The right hand side of Fig. 2 shows a number of hypothetical causes of the alleged 'startlement'. These include an idle stabilizer malfunction and a cruise control malfunction. The curious aspect of these two hypothetical causes of alleged startlement is that they are both intermittent electronic malfunctions. From a functional safety point of view, the allegedly startled driver appears to be merely amplifying the effect of the initial cause of 'startlement', which is claimed to be an engine surge that is itself the result of a hypothetical electronic malfunction. How the sequence of events postulated by the pedal error hypothesis, as expressed in Fig. 2 , can be considered to have its root cause in driver error is something that NHTSA has never explained.
In the author's opinion, Fig. 2 shows that the pedal error hypothesis is inherently flawed because it seems to require a primary event in the form of a malfunction in the engine electronics to set off the hypothetical chain of events that supposedly results in a sudden acceleration incident. The effect of identifying this flaw is to shift the spotlight away from human error as a potential cause of SA incidents and back onto hypothetical electronic malfunctions, where the spotlight should have been focussed in the first place and where it should now remain.
Two questions should now be asked:
• since the low speed inhibit logic present on all on all speed control systems is designed to prevent the throttle from opening un-commanded at low speeds, how could a sudden acceleration from low speed possibly occur?
• Even supposing the low speed inhibit logic were to fail, surely this would still trigger a fault code that was detectable after the event? It was questions like these, that led the author to start to consider the possibility that an electrical intermittency in a speed sensor connection might create a false speed signal of sufficient frequency to create the illusion, so far as the speed control system was concerned, that the vehicle was moving at normal road speed when in fact it was moving at a very low speed. Given the generation of such a hypothetical false speed signal, there seemed no reason why the speed control system could not engage when the vehicle was moving at any speed down more or less to standstill. There would only one way of finding out if this would happen in practice. This was by devising a simple and easily reproducible way of generating false speed signals and seeing how these might affect an electronic speed control system (see Part III).
II. AUTOMOBILE SPEED CONTROL

A. THE ROLE OF THE SPEEDOMETER IN ENSURING SPEED CONTROL
At the start of the 20th Century, many automobile accidents were caused by drivers imagining that they were moving at a different speed from their actual speed. The speed measurement problem was largely overcome by the invention and widespread adoption of the speedometer. The eddy current speedometer, patented by Schulze in 1902 [10] , rapidly established itself as the most popular type: a position that it maintained until it was displaced by the digital electronic speedometer 11 in the 1970s. The speedometer provided the essential speed feedback signal that enabled drivers to control speed by means of the accelerator, brake, clutch and gearbox. However even with speedometer feedback, drivers can still be given a false sense of speed by progressively reducing the spacing of chevrons on the road surface, for example, as is sometimes done in advance of road junctions: the driver is fooled into believing that he is travelling faster than he should and starts to slow down. If drivers can be easily fooled regarding speed, then, perhaps an electronic speed measuring system might be fooled in an analogous manner. 11 In the electronic speedometer a speed sensor in the transmission feeds an electrical signal to a dashboard instrument where it is decoded and displayed on an electronically controlled needle or digital display.
B. ACCELERATOR, BRAKE, CLUTCH (ABC) CONTROL OF VEHICLE SPEED
The driver controls speed primarily by foot pedal control. The ABC foot pedal arrangement for Accelerator, Brake and Clutch control was first used on the Ford Model A (1928-31) and gradually became the de facto world standard. When automatic gearboxes with hydraulic torque converters were introduced, the pedal arrangement was simplified to Accelerator and Brake (AB).
In an automatic gearbox the clutch is dispensed with and replaced by a hydrodynamic torque converter [11] . This consists of an impeller (the drive element) and a turbine (the driven element) and a stator which assists the torque-conversion. The torque converter is filled with oil and transmits torque by means of the flowing forces of the oil. It compensates for speed differences between the engine and the drive train and gives a very much smoother start off than a clutch. There is a torque multiplication effect that comes in when there is a speed difference between the engine and the transmission which reaches a maximum of about 2.5:1 when the slip is a maximum. This is equivalent to having an extra reduction gear in the drive train of 2.5:1 below bottom gear. The torque multiplication effect is exploited by drivers doing a jack rabbit start, but it will also come into effect during a sudden acceleration from standstill. In the author's opinion torque multiplication may account in part for why drivers find it very difficult to exert sufficient braking force to slow down during a sudden acceleration incident. In the case of a highly revving engine and a slowly rotating transmission the slip is large. The torque multiplication factor may be as high as 2.5:1 and drivers will have to exert 2.5 times as much braking force as they would normally expect to exert to bring the vehicle to a halt.
The driver of an automatic vehicle today controls speed, almost without conscious thought, by judicious alternate application of the right foot on the accelerator and the brake pedal. There is clearly nothing to prevent a driver from flooring the accelerator when they intend to operate the brake, or vice versa, except that they have been trained not to.
C. THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONICS ON VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL
Until the late 1960s automobile control systems were mechanical 12 and the automobile electrical system was very limited in extent. By the 1970s electronic control systems were beginning to become realizable at a size and cost where they might realistically deliver benefits in the mass-produced automobile [12] . Most early electronic control system applications in the automobile were directed towards improving engine performance by electronic engine control, with full electronic throttle control being the long-term aim. Electronic engine control was remarkably successful and brought substantial benefits such as improved idle control better emis- 12 The term mechanical includes hydraulic, vacuum and pneumatic systems. sion control, better fuel economy and better starting. For the time being, the outer manual vehicle speed control loop remained and the driver still exercised direct control of the throttle by means of the accelerator pedal linked by a flexible Bowden cable to the throttle. From the early 1970s development of electronic speed control (cruise control), with its own throttle control servo, went on more or less in parallel with engine ECU developments.
BMW extended electronic engine control by introducing the first electronic throttle on the 1987 BMW Series 7 [13] However, it was not until the early 2000s that electronic throttles were introduced in large numbers. Electronic throttle control is now the norm. Fig. 3 shows the torque based system structure of a modern Electronic Throttle [14] . The direct mechanical linkage between the accelerator pedal and the throttle has been replaced by an electronic linkage that has the same look and feel, but operates differently. When the driver presses the accelerator pedal, sensors send electrical messages (torque requests) to the engine ECU requesting it to move the throttle in such a direction as to increase or decrease the engine torque. The accelerator pedal torque request is one of a number of different torque requests that the 'Torque Coordinator' in the ECU has to balance out in the process of computing a desired throttle angle to which the throttle actuator is then commanded to move. Implicit in this diagram are vehicle speed and engine speed inputs, which need to be correct if the system is to function properly. Hypothetical false speed signals, if undetected, would have the potential for causing significant system disturbances: possibly causing a gear change at an inappropriate speed for example. With a mechanical throttle, the driver directly controls the throttle position via the accelerator pedal and Bowden cable link. With an electronic throttle system that is based on torque demands, the driver submits a request to the engine ECU for more or less torque. This represents a significant change in the relationship between the driver and the car. The engine ECU, is now in direct command of the electronic throttle and now controls the vehicle torque, acceleration and speed. By decoupling the driver from the throttle, by interposing an active control system in the form of the engine ECU and the electronic throttle, a new possibility of ''electronic VOLUME 2, 2014 disobedience'' is created should the ECU cease to ''listen'' to the requests of the driver.
If and when there should be a SA incident, the only means that the driver has at his disposal for re-establishing speed control is the brakes. This is because cars with electronic throttle control are not customarily fitted with a true failsafe that is totally independent of the electronic engine control. As a result of this failure to attend to the requirements of electronic functional safety, it is the driver who, by default, becomes the fail-safe for any potential malfunction of the electronic throttle. The automobile industry is unique in this respect -in any other industry loss of speed control would be protected against and, as a last resort, there would be an emergency stop button.
D. ELECTRONIC SPEED CONTROL IN PRACTICE
Automobile speed control (Cruise Control) was first introduced in the 1970s to lessen driver fatigue and save fuel on long journeys. It immediately became popular in the USA, but it was much less popular in Europe where the opportunities for using speed control were fewer. Fig. 4 [18] shows an early stand-alone electronic speed control system that used a vacuum servo to operate the throttle. This analog design formed the basis of many first-generation speed control systems.. Electronic speed control is self-evidently safety critical and should have been treated as such from the outset, like the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS).
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) recommended in 1970 [15] that: 'An alternative hand-operated deactivation control within the reach of the driver, in addition to the brake, clutch (if so equipped) and ignition key shall be provided.' Follmer (1973) [16] recommended a fail-safe design, commenting that 'The ability to survive in a given environment must be designed in, it cannot be added later on. ' Espeland (1975) [17] wrote in a NHTSA report on the potential effects of EMI in automobiles:
''If, under conditions imposed by a non-moving vehicle the speed controller had a serious EMI problem when the car is not moving, deactivation of the circuit may be the least costly approach to solving the interference problem. Such a circumstance could exist with certain classes of electronic ignition control because of pulsing characteristics of power transistors and the inductive load of the ignition coil. An overlapping pulse rise and decay characteristic which may have radiative additive components could exist at higher engine speeds. The solution with electronic techniques would involve some expensive shielding procedures, but with deactivation of the speed controller, a significant cost savings in EMI assurance would be evident. '' It seems that the manufacturers took no notice of the advice they were being given. De facto, speed control systems were categorised and described as 'leisure systems' or 'driver assist systems', thereby implying that they were not safety-critical and therefore did not require the kind of close independent scrutiny regarding functional safety that they would otherwise have had. a period of about 12 years from the 1992 model year onwards.
It was a unit of this kind that the author used as the target speed control system in the experimental work described in Section III of this paper.
Modern speed control systems in vehicles fitted with electronic throttles work on the same functional principles as these earlier stand-alone systems.
• The input control switch arrangement show in Figs. 4 and 5 has remained more or less the same.
• The pulse counting method of speed measurement and the low speed lockout mechanism have remained the same, but they are now implemented within the engine ECU software.
Automobile speed control systems provide closed loop speed control by means of an electronic servo operating on the throttle to which the driver passes control by means of the ON control switch fitted either on the steering wheel, or a stalk behind the steering wheel. The driver re-establishes direct control of speed, in theory at least, either by pressing the speed control OFF button, or by pressing on the brake.
Systems with vacuum servos have an additional ''dump valve'' attached to the brake pedal that allows air into servo vacuum system when the brakes are applied hard. Systems with electrical servos are usually fitted with some kind of electrical speed control deactivation switch that operates when the brake pedal is fully depressed. Fig. 7 above shows a simplified block diagram of a typical automobile speed control system in which measured speed V r is compared with a reference or set speed V s stored in memory. The speed error V e = (V r -V s ) controls the movement of a throttle servo and determines the air/fuel volume flowing into the engine. The reference speed Vr is the sampled value of V s measured when the set button is pressed.
• If noise modulates Vs at the time the speed control is set, the speed sampling detector may register a false set speed that is either higher or lower than the actual speed.
• If noise continues to modulate Vs, then there will be a varying apparent speed error that will cause the vehicle to accelerate or decelerate to bring the vehicle speed into line with the set speed.
• If the apparent speed error oscillates the speed control will try reduce it and the vehicle speed, instead of being locked to the set speed will oscillate in order to try and reduce the apparent speed error. 13 Automobile speed control systems need a speed signal input in order to provide:
1. a low-speed inhibit function; 2. a feedback of road speed; 3. a set speed, or reference speed, derived from road speed, against which to control speed; 4. from the difference between (2) and (3) the speed error, which the system tries to reduce to zero.
If it were not for the low speed inhibit function, the speed control system could in principle engage at any speed above zero. The low speed inhibit function is intended to stop the speed control system from engaging at below a normal road speed of about 25 mph and it takes as its input vehicle road speed, or what it ''thinks'' is vehicle road speed. The problem is that the speed control system has no way of determining whether or not the speed signal that it detects and stores in memory corresponds with the road speed. This potential weakness that is built in to the speed control speed measuring sub-system appears to have gone unrecognized both by automobile manufacturers and by NHTSA. Part III following will consider how a false speed signal might be generated that would pass for genuine and defeat the lowspeed inhibit function without triggering a diagnostic trouble code.
III. THE GENERATION OF FALSE SPEED SIGNALS A. THE GENERATION OF FALSE SPEED SIGNALS WITH AN ANALOG SPEED SENSOR
Consider a speed control system that uses an analog speed sensor which generates a sinusoidal waveform with frequency and amplitude proportional to speed. The speed detection circuitry counts the number of zero crossing points of the sine wave in the sampling time in order to determine the signal frequency and hence vehicle speed. Under certain circumstances noise may cause a greater number of zero crossing points in unit sampling time and hence cause an error in the detected speed. Fig. 8 shows an oscilloscope trace of the speed voltage at the input to a speed control servo of the type shown in Fig. 5 . The vehicle in question had its wheels raised off the ground with the speed control set and engaged at a typical road speed. The speed sensor arrangement was similar to that shown in Fig. A5-3 . The speed waveform appears to be significantly distorted from the expected sinusoidal waveform and has a number of noise components at other frequencies beating with it. Note the regular voltage spikes which appear to be of a slightly higher frequency than the fundamental of the signal frequency.
In spite of the engagement of the speed control, the engine and transmission appeared to be hunting about the set speed. 14 A possible explanation for the cause of the voltage spikes is EMI from the ignition or the fuel injectors. Unfortunately the author had limited access to the vehicle and was not able to confirm this. These three types of intermittent fault can be simulated to a first degree by interrupting a low frequency speed signal with a reed relay, thereby modulating the sine wave speed voltage waveforms as shown in Fig. 10A to 10C. The frequency of at which the reed relay operates can be varied. Fig. 10A shows that a speed signal voltage of 20 Hz (road speed circa 10 mph) interrupted by a 200 Hz intermittency will produce a false speed signal that allows the speed control system shown in Fig. 4 to operate when it should not. Fig. 10B shows that if the interrupting frequency is reduced to 120 Hz the false speed signal will still allow the speed control to operate provided that a small direct voltage offset is applied. Fig. 10C shows that a speed signal voltage of 30 Hz, (road speed circa 15 mph), and an 80 Hz interrupting frequency plus a small direct voltage offset will also allow the speed control to operate. As might be expected, the higher the interrupting frequency the greater the number of zero voltage points within a half cycle of the interrupted speed signal and the greater the likelihood that the speed measuring circuit will accept the false speed signal as being above the minimum speed cut off and allow the speed control to engage. 
B. THE GENERATION OF FALSE SPEED SIGNALS WITH A DIGITAL SENSOR
A digital speed sensor provides a pulsed output with a fixed mark space ratio with a pulse repetition rate proportional to speed. VOLUME 2, 2014 Fig. 11 shows elements of a typical automobile magnetoresistive speed sensor with a digital output. Sensors of this kind are cheap and robust. They have a high signal-to-noise ratio and work at all speeds down to standstill. The sensor comprises:
. A typical magneto-resistive speed sensor.
• a four-element magneto-resistive bridge that senses changes in the magnetic field produced by a multi-polar magnet driven by the transmission;
• a comparator that changes state every time the multi-pole field changes direction;
• a voltage regulator to regulate the voltage to items (1) and (2);
• a switching transistor fed directly from the +12V supply that acts as a pulse shaper producing a nominal +12V/0V square wave pulse train with a frequency proportional to road speed. The three sensor connections are: Aa to the +12V supply; Bb to the speed control system speed sensor input; and Cc the speed sensor connection to the Speed Control ground.
It might be thought that a digital speed sensor in good working order would always give a reliable digital speed signal, but this is not necessarily the case. The following potential connector fault conditions exist:
• a nominal +12V signal reaching point b will be interrupted if an intermittency occurs anywhere in connection Aa, or Bb (for example, in a connector, a crimped joint or in either of the two wires);
• if the signal reaching b is at a nominal 0V, intermittency in the connection Cc will cause the voltage at B to rise to +12V. Periodic intermittency anywhere in Aa, Bb or Cc will therefore interrupt, or modulate, the speed sensor signal. In the presence of a periodic intermittency, two digital signals of different frequency -the speed signal pulse train and the interruption pulse train -will beat against one another, giving additional frequency components not present in the speed signal itself. The result will be a false speed signal in the form of a false +12V/0V pulse train that the speed measuring circuitry may interpret as a genuine speed signal.
As in the case of analog speed sensor dealt with in the previous section, the ''false speed signal'' effect caused by a periodic electrical intermittency can be simulated with a reed relay placed at A, a, B, b, C or c in Fig. 11 driven from a variable frequency supply. See Fig. 12 . Since the speed detection circuit used in most microprocessor-based speed control systems merely counts the numbers of pulses in the speed signal's pulse train over a given period of time, the false digital speed signal will be treated by the system in just the same way as if the signal were genuine. With a digital speed sensor, this particular commercial automobile speed control system could be caused to operate on a test bench with a false speed signal even when the speed sensor itself is was at standstill. In other words, the mechanically excited electrical intermittency behaves as if it was a genuine speed signal generator. This situation could arise:
1) if the sensor drive connection failed or the rotating (magnetic) portion jammed, or 2) if a malfunction in the sensor electronics resulted in the output sticking at logic value 1 and the intermittency was at position B as in Fig. 11 , as might happen in the event of a transient causing a latch-up condition in, for example, a transistor within the comparator or the pulse-shaping transistor. Generally, if one transistor in an IC latches-up, all latch up, except in the case of so-called ''dielectric isolation'' types of IC.
C. A COMMENT ON THE METHOD OF SIMULATING MECHANICAL-INDUCED ELECTRICAL INTERMITTENCIES WITH REED RELAYS
The use of a reed relay to simulate a mechanically-induced electrical intermittency as described above, either as an open circuit or a short circuit, is not difficult to implement. The reed relay can be driven by a variety of different means, according to requirements at different frequencies from zero upwards within the frequency response of the relay. There is no reason why multiple simultaneous or even time-displaced intermittencies could not be simulated using a break-in box, several reed relays and the appropriate driving circuits. It should be noted that standard EMC testing does not attempt to simulate the effect of a mechanically-induced electrical intermittency.
IV. ELECTRICAL INTERMITTENCIES FOUND IN THE AUTOMOBILE
In Part III it was shown that intermittent speed sensor electrical connections can generate false speed signals that automobile speed control system speed measuring circuitry will treat as genuine. The consequences that may flow from this very simple experimental work in terms of loss of speed control were discussed. This raises the question as to what kind of intermittencies might actually occur in practice that could act as the false speed signal generator in the range of a few Hz up to about 500 Hz. Appendix V, Section A provides a general background review of the subject of intermittent electrical contacts, see references [20] to [43] at the end of this paper.
Appendix V, Sections B to E, specifically cover the following categories of electrical intermittency found in automobiles: grounding and battery intermittencies; connector intermittencies; wiring intermittencies; printed circuit board intermittencies. These categories are illustrated in part by a limited set of photographs taken by the author during various failure investigations, some of which are also shown in Fig. 14. The purpose of selecting the photographs was to provide examples that might better enable anyone attempting to carry out failure investigations to identify types of damage, often on a microscopic scale, caused by vibration that could give rise to electrical intermittency and that, in some circumstances, might generate false speed signals. A feature of some of these observed faults is that they might be very difficult to locate and confirm in a normal automobile servicing environment.
V. THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FALSE SPEED SIGNAL RESULTING FROM A MECHANICALLY-INDUCED ELECTRICAL INTERMITTENCY A. FLUCTUATING ELECTRONIC SPEEDOMETER
Electronic speedometers use the same technique for measuring speed as described in Part III and therefore would be expected to behave in the same way. The vehicle speed signal is used as a reference for the speed control system. However, it is the author's opinion that false speed signals may also have the potential for causing malfunctions in other speed-dependent safety critical systems not discussed here.
B. VEHICLE AT NEAR STANDSTILL MOVING BELOW NORMAL ROAD SPEED
Consider the situation of a vehicle at or near standstill, Fig. 15 . Normally the speed control software would detect the low value of the speed sensor frequency and prevent the speed control from activating if the vehicle speed was below the critical road speed of circa 25 mph. However a false speed signal would make it appear that the vehicle was moving at more than 25 mph when it was moving well below that speed. The electronic interlock mechanism designed to prevent low speed engagement of the speed control system would therefore fail and the microprocessor software would allow the speed control system to engage if the speed control was by some means turned on, as discussed later.
Once a set speed value, derived from the false speed signal, was held in memory, the speed control system, working normally, would try to control the throttle to bring the vehicle speed up to the apparent set speed. If the set speed were significantly greater than the apparent speed at the instant of speed control engagement, there would be a large apparent speed error and the throttle would move wide open and the vehicle would accelerate up to the set speed. As the apparent speed error reduced, the throttle would then tend to close. If the vehicle encountered any obstacles the apparent speed error would increase and the throttle would open in order to try to reduce the speed error. Given a false speed signal, there appears to be no lower speed limit to the operation of the speed control. It therefore becomes possible for the system to ''take over'' speed control from the driver at low speeds where, previously, this might have been thought impossible. All that seems to be required is a single mechanically-induced intermittency in one of the speed sensor connections or on the microcontroller PCB, plus a signal to tell the cruise control to engage.
Appendix E of the 1989 Sudden Acceleration Report by NHTSA seems to bear this out:
''Intermittent connections in the speed sensing circuitry or intermediate processing stages could conceivably generate electrical noise which could be interpreted as a valid speed signal above the minimum value so that if a driver happened to bump the set or resume controls the cruise control might engage or ''resume'' to a previously set speed even though the vehicle was actually stopped or going very slowly [44] .''
The NHTSA researchers do not appear to have followed up these tentative ideas. In the author's opinion, a hypothetical transient on the electrical system that upset the control signal line from the control switches to the microprocessor causing it to go into speed control mode could fulfil the same switching function as bumping the set or resume controls. Another possibility is an electrostatic discharge (ESD). People cannot feel less than an electrostatic voltage of about 4 kV, and even this voltage, which can easily be generated by movement of the driver's clothes against a plastic seat cover, can track for several tens of mm across dirty plastic surfaces -for example tracking from the driver to the steering wheel and entering a speed control touch button mounted on the steering wheel and discharging to the two-wire multiplexed control circuit of the speed control system. 15 
C. VEHICLE MOVING AT NORMAL ROAD SPEED
At a normal road speed a mechanically induced intermittency in the speed sensor circuit would modulate and beat with the speed signal. Over time, the apparent measured vehicle speed would fluctuate above and below the true vehicle speed, supposing the latter to remain constant. The result would be a fluctuating digital speedometer reading, but there would be no effect on vehicle speed. 15 The speed control switching arrangement, usually mounted on the steering wheel, has changed very little since the first cruise control systems were introduced in the 1970s. See Figs. 3 and 4 . It comprises in principle ON, OFF (Ground), SET/ACCEL, COAST and RESUME functions. These functions are performed using momentary switches and a single signal line and a ground line feeding the speed control microcontroller. ON connects +12V momentarily to the signal wire. OFF momentarily grounds the signal wire. The other functions are carried out by momentarily connecting different resistances across the signal and ground lines. The arrangement is inherently vulnerable to malfunction because of vibration, high contact resistances in the momentary switches, tracking on the switch PCBs in the presence of moisture, EMI (Electromagnetic Interference) and ESD (Electrostatic discharge) (charged driver discharging to the steering wheel).
However, if the speed control speed reference were set by the false speed signal, then it might set either above or below the actual speed, depending where in the beat cycle the setting took place. On engagement, the speed control would try to minimise the error between the measured speed and the apparent set speed. Depending on the speed control system gain, this could result in continued and significant speed oscillations, or in a sudden acceleration to a higher set speed or, possibly, a sudden deceleration to a lower set speed.
The Appeal Judgement in Roback v Transportation Incorporated (1996) [45] provides an interesting summary of five separate incidents when the speed of a heavy truck fluctuated erratically on engagement of its speed control. After each of the first two incidents, each terminated by the driver switching off the speed control, the speed sensor was replaced with no effect. The third and fourth incidents were also terminated by the driver switching off the speed control. After the 4th incident the mechanic found the speed sensor to be working, and that a bolt holding together the two halves of the 16 way plug located at the truck firewall had been stripped, resulting in a loose connection. This was repaired and the system then passed its diagnostic checks. However, it appears that other possible locations of loose connections were not identified and were not checked out at the time. When the driver next engaged the speed control the 5 th incident occurred.
According to the court records, the speedometer displayed wildly fluctuating speeds, the engine raced and the cab began to shake. The accelerator pedal dropped to the floor and the vehicle began to accelerate. The driver looked at the dashboard to locate the toggle switch that deactivated the speed control and managed to switch it off. In the process, he failed to spot a stationary line of traffic ahead until perilously close. He slammed on the brakes, but was too late to avoid a collision. Independent examination after the accident con-firmed erratic signals from the speed sensor of the truck and the un-commanded opening and closing of the throttle even though the actual truck speed remained more or less constant. A video tape recording made during the testing revealed dramatic fluctuations in the digital speedometer reading over impossibly short periods of time (three seconds, for example).
Freidman et al (2013) [46] have recently been carrying out electronic crash, defect and cause analyses using the electronic data from several real-world crashes. They have presented several case studies to ''demonstrate the effects of control module algorithms, events, faults and actions.'' In one instance they say: ''the vehicle electronics seized control of the vehicle traveling at high speed''.
It appears that, during the incident Friedman subsequently analysed, a number of electronic control modules produced Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) indicating system faults, in particular:
'limit speed exceeded', 'noise algorithm active', 'ESC (Electronic Stability Control) slip angle error'.
This combination of DTCs appears to have initiated a mandatory calibration procedure called 'Fail-soft', repeated each second for an interval of up to 6 to 9 seconds, before returning electronic controls to the driver.
During the 'Fail-soft' the vehicle was controlled by the stored status of the throttle position, wheel braking, and steering angle. The paper says: ''A complete case study identified a defect and proved that the defect was the proximate cause of injury and death. Surprisingly, these modules can seize control of a drive-by-wire vehicle and actually cause loss of control, resulting in a crash and injury ranging in severity from minor to fatal.' ' Reading between the lines, it would appear that the software had detected: 1) that a speed signal appeared to have gone above some set limit and this triggered a DTC, 2) a noise algorithm, perhaps on a sensor had triggered a second DTC, 3) the ESC had calculated a slip angle error that had in turn triggered a third DTC, 4) the combination of the appearance of the 3 DTCs had triggered the 'Fail soft'.
The system designers do not appear to have anticipated all the possible consequences of initiating the Fail Soft, which took away driver control when it was most needed.
Friedman does not address the question of what it was that caused the 'limit speed exceeded' DTC to be triggered. However, it would appear that there is no reason to suppose that the crash vehicle's actual road speed had exceeded the speed limit set by the software. Does the fact that the 'noise algorithm active' DTC was also triggered provide the clue to what was really going on? It is possible to speculate that a false excess speed signal, i.e. an over speed signal generated as a result of the mechanisms described in Section III of this paper, could provide one possible and reasonably plausible explanation for what was evidently a very dangerous loss of speed control.
VI. POSSIBLE WAYS OF REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUDDEN ACCELERATIONS A. FAIL-SAFE MECHANISMS
Automobile fail-safe design philosophy for speed control systems, as presented by NHTSA in their 1989 Sudden Acceleration Report [4] and still current today seems to accept that it is reasonable to rely on the speed control logic of a speed control system to prevent inappropriate operation at low vehicle speeds. However, as this paper has shown, the speed control inhibit function will fail in the presence of a false speed signal.
It is the author's opinion that had the principle of electrical de-energization of the speed control system below normal road speed been adopted, as recommended in ref [17] , the incidence of sudden accelerations from standstill, which constitute the majority of sudden acceleration incidents, would have been significantly reduced.
Little seems to have changed since the 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report. In the event of an un-commanded build-up of engine power the automobile industry still seems to find it acceptable to treat the driver as the fail save for the failed electronics. It is quite unnecessary, contrary to sound engineering practice and potentially hazardous for drivers to be called upon to brake against full engine power in the event of a SA incident. One NHTSA test memorandum [47] reports that significant brake pedal force in excess of 150 pounds was required to stop one particular vehicle during a simulated SA incident, compared to 30 pounds required when the vehicle was operating normally and that stopping distances increased from less than 200 feet to more than 1,000 feet. Some people would find such large forces difficult or impossible to generate and sustain, especially over a distance of 1000 ft. From a functional safety point of view to make the driver the failsafe for the electronics -which means having to brake against full engine power-is unacceptable.
This problem may be exacerbated in the case of vehicles with automatic gearboxes because of the potential torque multiplying effect of the torque converter. The torque multiplication effect with a revving engine and a large value of slip lies between 2 and 2.5, which is equivalent to an extra 2 to 2.5 step down gear ratio [11] . This makes it much harder to brake the vehicle, and quite possibly accounts for the seemingly tanklike behaviour in some low speed incidents where vehicles have damaged houses, as in Fig. 1 , gone through brick walls, pushed other vehicles out of their way, ridden up over kerbs or landed up on top of other vehicles.
A number of manufacturers have introduced the so-called intelligent throttle system that detects if the brake and the accelerator pedals have been pressed simultaneously and closes the throttle to the limp home position. This is a failsafe against an allegedly malfunctioning driver, but it fails to address situations in which the electronic throttle control system itself malfunctions.
In the author's opinion, there is still an unrecognised and unsatisfied functional safety requirement to provide an automatic fail-safe that is totally independent of the engine control electronics.
In the author's opinion the most effective way of dealing with potential SA incidents, is to kill them at birth by restricting the fuel supply to the engine the moment that an un-commanded wide open throttle condition is detected.
Other possible methods include: suppression of half or a lower fraction of the ignition pulses to reduce engine power; opening a bypass valve in the hydraulic torque converter to reduce the transmitted power (decoupling the torque converter). In vehicles with a manual gearbox and the clutch serves as a very good fail-safe because it disconnects completely the engine from the transmission.
Fuel cut-offs that operate in the case of a crash are already a normal fitment. Some vehicles have extra ''slamshut'' throttle plates as part of their traction control systems, see Fig. 16 , that could be adapted for use if a false speed signal or an un-commanded wide open throttle was detected. US patent 04995364 ''Throttle Control for Engines'' [48] shows an auxiliary series throttle that comes into operation should the main throttle become stuck in the wide open position.
B. POTENTIAL ELECTRONIC SPEED SENSOR AND RELATED CONTROL SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS
This paper has shown how critical accurate speed sensing is to the proper functioning of the automobile speed control system. But many other systems such as traction control, automatic stability systems, engine torque control and electronic steering assist now also depend on accurate speed measurement. False speed signals might be expected to have the potential for upsetting these systems too and in unexpected ways. Also, as demonstrated in Part 1, EDR data downloads do not necessarily record accurate spot speeds in the seconds before crash impact and cannot necessarily therefore be relied upon, yet they are increasingly treated as if proven to be accurate. Clearly therefore, for a variety of reasons, there is a considerable need for improved speed sensing that is immune to the generation of false speed signals.
Some manufacturers have moved away from using a single dedicated speed sensor for the speed control system and now derive the speed signal by averaging the signals coming from several ABS (Anti-lock Braking System) wheel speed sensors. This can provide a cleaner and more reliable speed signal, but does not overcome the potential problem that would arise if an intermittent contact should occur between the ABS speed signal output and the speed control system input.
A three channel speed control system with majority voting is technically feasible, and would protect against random failures. However it would not protect against ''common cause'' events such as EMI since the reliability would only be the same as a single channel. A three channel system using a different design approach for each channel would probably not be too costly for automobiles. ICs can now have multiple microprocessors of different types on one chip and can be made in auto industry volumes that would probably cost no more than three identical processors.
Another alternative might be to take a fresh look at what might be achieved in detecting false speed signals by the use of active speed sensors. These allow the integration of a Hall measuring element, and signal conditioning in an IC (Integrated Circuit) and have now well advanced beyond the design illustrated in Fig. 11 . The wheel speed data can now be transferred by a two wire current loop as an impressed current in the form of square wave pulses of a frequency proportional to road speed, typically 7mA (low) and 14mA (high). Local digital signal processing in the IC makes it possible to transfer additional coded information using a pulse-width modulated output signal. For example the following information can be sent by modulating the width of speed signal pulses:
(a) vehicle is reversing; (b) vehicle is moving forwards; (c) vehicle is stationary; and (d) providing the output of local signal diagnosis e.g. the signal quality of the sensor [49] .
Any noise on the system is likely to result in an irregular pulse train with some pulses of expected width and some of random pulse width which the ECU software ought to be able to detect. In the author's view, there is no reason why the ECU software should not be designed to rapidly distinguish between true and false speed signals and, in the event of ''seeing'' a speed signal irregularity -equivalent to identifying missing or extra ''heart beats'' -either prevent the speed control loop from coming into operation, or immediately disengage it. VOLUME 2, 2014
C. POSSIBLE WAYS OF IMPROVING ELECTRICAL CONTACTS
It is generally accepted that the majority of intermittent electronic failures are caused by intermittent faults in cables and connectors. There is no reason to suppose that the situation is greatly different with automobile speed control systems.
The likelihood of intermittent electrical contacts developing can be minimised by using electrical connector systems that have been specifically designed to resist fretting under high levels of vibration. These connector systems usually have some extra springing that keeps contact forces normal to the plane of contact and prevents fretting.
Electrical contact lubricants, for which manufacturers claim improvements in contact reliability by factors of between 10 and 100. Laboratory contact improvement tests are typically reported for 500,000 fretting cycles. How the results of such tests might extrapolate to real world conditions, where 500,000 fretting cycles might accumulate in perhaps 1200 miles on the clock and the contacts are subject to a cocktail of pollutants, is however far from clear. Chudnovsky [50] reviews 40 years of published research on contact lubricants and concludes that it is important to properly choose and thoroughly qualify a lubrication product for a specific contact material and a specific combination of environmental variables. Inappropriate lubricants, rather than preventing fretting may induce a significant risk of developing high electrical resistance between the contact surfaces. Fig. 17 below shows an example of an 8 pin sensor connector from the engine compartment of an automobile where an electrical contact lubricant was introduced to improve reliability. In the author's opinion, electrical contact lubricants, if applied during assembly, should be regarded as having the capability to significantly reduce contact oxidation, fretting and galvanic corrosion for the first few years of a car's life. It would be unrealistic not to expect some deterioration in the properties of the contact lubricant with time, especially in the hostile environment of the engine compartment. Re-lubricating contacts at regular service intervals would seem feasible.
D. SOME SIMPLE PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN VEHICLES ALREADY ON THE ROAD
What practical measures might either minimise the risk of sudden acceleration incidents occurring or reduce their severity if they should occur?
It is reasonably well established that some SA incidents appear to have coincided with changes in electrical load and the Belt Hypothesis [51] suggests that a prime factor may be the reduced capability of the battery to hold charge as it ages. A battery in a poor condition, with sulphated plates for example, will not necessarily be able to smooth out transient current demands and the voltage regulation of the system will suffer. Measuring the Battery CCA rating could easily be made a routine part of servicing checks. The sensible driver ought to have the CCA rating measured regularly and, if it should fall too far, he ought to install a replacement battery of the same or higher CCA rating. 16 In order to minimise system noise that could upset speed and other sensor signals and interfere with operation of the engine ECU and especially its control of the throttle, it is highly desirable to keep the DC bus impedance low at all times. This could be done by connecting super capacitors in parallel with the DC Bus. The super-capacitor-battery combination could cost less than a battery on its own. This is because the super-capacitor can handle the starting and transient currents, leaving a smaller conventional battery to handle the steady loads. Some automobile manufacturers are already doing this, so the idea is clearly practical [52] .
Changing brake fluid regularly keeps the moisture content low and maintains the boiling point at a sufficiently high temperature to avoid the formation of vapour locks. This would give the driver faced with a SA incident a better chance of bringing the vehicle under control by braking.
The diagnostic checklist for vehicles being investigated for sudden acceleration complaints should be expanded to include measuring the conductivity of the brake fluid to check for the presence of moisture and measuring the battery CCA rating to check for any indication of the loss of the battery's capacity hold charge.
The recommended consensus method of dealing with sudden acceleration incidents [53] is as follows:
''Put the car in neutral. No matter the RPMs of an engine, a car cannot accelerate without being in gear. If putting the car in neutral fails, then shut off the engine (NOTE, shutting off the engine while a car is moving can be dangerous, as you will lose power-steering and brake-assist. . . . this method should be a last resort only). Once you have the car under control, shift it to park and turn off the engine. This should clear the fault. In many cases of sudden acceleration, the brakes alone are not enough to stop a car at wide open throttle. As a result, shifting to neutral is always the best option.'' 16 Going for the cheapest option when buying a replacement battery will probably mean buying a battery with a low CCA capacity and possibly of less robust build.
As far the author is aware, few, if any, automobile manufacturers provide this kind of information in the owner's manual:
• learner drivers should be informed about the potential risks of sudden acceleration and should be trained in how best to react;
• Advice similar to that in Ref [53] should be provided in vehicle owner manuals;
• Pedestrians should be informed that any stationary vehicle should be approached with caution because of its latent potential to suddenly accelerate;
• Traffic controllers and traffic police and should be trained in how to best to deal with runaway vehicles. There is clearly a need for the more effective identification of automobile electronic intermittencies, especially those that occur at a frequency that could generate false speed signals, but what these means might be is not currently known.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has drawn attention to the flawed diagnostic investigative approach that is commonly adopted in the case of alleged sudden acceleration incidents that is based on the fallacy that 'absence of proof is proof of absence' and that results in such incidents becoming attributed by default to driver error.
It questions the assumption made in the 1989 NHTSA sudden acceleration report that 'If the cause of an SAI is an intermittent electronic failure. . . . the failure mode should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests. ' This paper examines the pedal error hypothesis as expressed in the 1989 NHTSA report and points out that in defining it, the 1989 NHTSA report inadvertently moves the spotlight away from the driver back onto what may allegedly cause the driver to malfunction i.e. a hypothetical malfunction either of the speed control system throttle servo electronics or the idle stabilizer control system. From a functional safety point of view, the allegedly 'startled' driver appears to be merely amplifying the effect of the initial cause of 'startlement', which is an electronic malfunction in the engine control, and they cannot therefore be considered to be the root cause of the sudden acceleration. This paper has demonstrated by experiment, it is believed for the first time, that intermittent speed sensor connections can generate false speed signals above the minimum road speed at which a speed control system would normally engage. The false speed signal overcomes low speed inhibit logic and could allow the speed control system to engage well below normal road speed, indeed at any speed above zero. 17 17 Ref [44] suggests that NHTSA were thinking on similar lines in 1985: ''Intermittent connections in the speed sensing circuitry or intermediate processing stages could conceivably generate electrical noise which could be interpreted as a valid speed signal above the minimum value so that if a driver happened to bump the set or resume controls the cruise control might engage or ''resume'' to a previously set speed even though the vehicle was actually stopped or going very slowly.'' However NHTSA did not follow up the matter by trying to simulate intermittent connections that would generate noise of the right frequency. This paper explains how false speed signals could cause variations in speed about the set speed when a speed control system is in operation. There is good evidence in the case of Ref [45] of just such an intermittency causing both a fluctuating speedometer and also significant speed oscillations about the mean road speed when speed control was engaged.
The method of introducing a reed relay into any particular sensor circuit to simulate an intermittency is not unduly difficult to effect, requiring only a breakout box in the right location. There is no reason why multiple simultaneous intermittencies should not be simulated in this way with additional reed relays.
Various measures are suggested for improving the integrity of automobile speed measurement, with a view to reducing the likelihood of false speed signals disturbing the integrity of speed control systems and other control systems and the EDR that rely on receiving an accurate speed signal input.
This paper highlights the fact that at present, in the event of an un-commanded wide open throttle, it is customary to allow full engine power to develop, against which the driver is then required to exercise heavy sustained braking to bring the vehicle under control. This is quite unacceptable from a functional safety point of view because it forces the driver to act as the fail-safe for the electronics and places excessive demands on the braking system, especially if torque multiplication comes into the equation.
This paper draws attention to the torque multiplication effect of the torque converter at high slips, such as occur when an engine speed surge occurs. Torque multiplication is a desirable feature of a hydraulic coupling and enables very smooth starting from standstill. However, it means that in a sudden acceleration incident the vehicle will have the equivalent of an extra 2.5:1 step down gear between the engine and the transmission. Reported tank-like behaviour of suddenly accelerating vehicles, evidenced by charging through walls or over kerbs, or even vehicles crawling up over other vehicles are therefore entirely explicable. The SA shown in Fig. 1 would appear to be an example of where the torque multiplying effect of the torque converter came into effect.
Electronic brake over-ride systems are now offered as a cure-all for SA problems. These systems comprise software running on the same hardware as the electronic throttle and cannot be expected to work if there is a software malfunction. They are therefore only a partial fail safe against pressing the accelerator at the same time as the brake. This paper discusses preventive measures against sudden acceleration, including warning drivers in particular what to do in the event. The possible benefit of stiffening up DC bus regulation with super-capacitors has been suggested. The importance of regularly checking the battery CCA rating and, should this fall too low, replacing the battery has been emphasised.
In the author's opinion, the automobile industry needs to adopt a similar rigorous approach to functional safety to that used in other safety-critical industries where, since 2000, Functional Safety standard IEC 61508 has been the norm. The first edition of ISO 26262, which is an adaption of IEC 61508 for Automotive Electric and/or Electronic Systems, was published in November 2011. This standard 'addresses possible hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safetyrelated systems, including interaction of these systems'. ISO 26262 has not yet been fully implemented. In practical terms, manufacturers concerned to establish a high level of electronic functional safety should start by building into their electronic throttle designs effective means of automatically APPENDIX I reducing or cutting engine power in an emergency that are totally independent of the vehicle's own electronic speed control system/electronic throttle.
A number of fail-safe measures are discussed in the paper. If fail-safe measures truly independent of the engine control electronics were introduced, sudden accelerations, whatever their cause, would be largely prevented. A kill switch that reduced engine power, or a manually operated pressure relief valve in the torque converter would be a good start. 
APPENDIX II EIGHT SA INCIDENTS IN CONFINED SPACES FROM THE NHTSA ODI DATABASE
VOLUME
A. BACKGROUND
On the morning of 16 November 2012 a mother living in Stevenson Ranch California was carrying three teenage girls to school in her 2012 Toyota Highlander. As she pulled into the parking area in front of a property at the end of O'Hara Lane to pick up a fourth child, the vehicle suddenly accelerated a short distance into the right hand of two garages. 18 It appears that the driver then put the vehicle into reverse. As the vehicle accelerated backwards into the road, she managed to slow it down by putting it into forward gear. The vehicle then accelerated forward for the second time and hit the garage on the left. She then put the vehicle into reverse for the second time and it accelerated backwards into the road once more, at which point it rotated anti-clockwise about its back end through more than 180 degrees. The incident terminated when the front left hand wheel hit the curb violently and the stub axle was damaged. Nobody was hurt. The Toyota Highlander and one vehicle housed within the garages had to be written off and another vehicle was damaged. Toyota inspected the Highlander, downloaded the EDR data and later provided the owner with a copy of the Bosch EDR report. The author of this paper analyzed the video and the EDR records and divided the incident into 9 distinct phases, see Fig. A3-2 , the color coded table that follows.
B. DISCUSSION
The implicit claim from the EDR data for UA1 is that the vehicle moved 74.9 ft. during the recording period of 4.6 seconds before the first impact. However, the distance moved as determined from the video record in this time, is approximately 25 ft. The EDR data appears to overestimate the distance covered in the UA incident by a factor of about 3. The correlation between the video record and the EDR record for UA1 is questionable for the following additional reasons:
• -4. • -3.6 seconds: the video shows that the vehicle is moving slowly over the footpath. The EDR record however claims a vehicle speed of 13.7 mph and an ''Accel. Rate'' of 3.09V. i.e. that the throttle was nearly wide open. The throttle clearly was not nearly wide open at this time.
• -2.6 seconds: the LH front wheel has advanced beyond footpath. The EDR record however claims the speed has decreased to 9.9 mph. The video shows that the speed, although low, is now increasing. • -1.6 seconds: the video record suggests that the engine is now starting to roar and that the vehicle is beginning to accelerate.
The EDR record claims that the speed has dropped to 5.8 mph, the throttle has closed and the engine RPM has risen to 3600
RPM. Not only do the video and EDR records differ greatly, but the EDR record is manifestly inconsistent with itself.
• -0.6 seconds: according to the EDR record the throttle has now gone wide open again, but the engine speed has dropped from 3,600 to 2,000 RPM. • 0 seconds: The EDR record claims that the engine speed has risen again from 2,000 to 3,200 RPM.
• The distance between road and garage is approx. 25 ft. If this distance was covered in 4.6 seconds, as the video indicates, then average velocity would have been 5.4 ft./sec. Assuming a uniform acceleration, the peak velocity at impact would have been twice this, or 10.8 ft/sec i.e. 7.4 mph. The claimed EDR impact speed is 14.9 mph, or about twice the impact speed as estimated from the video on a uniform acceleration basis. 19 Overall, considering all seven points above, there does not appear to be any correlation whatsoever between the video and the EDR records for UA1.
As far as UA2 is concerned, the implicit claim from the EDR data is that the vehicle moved 99.3 ft. during the record- 19 An accident reconstruction expert would probably be able to construct a better acceleration profile from the video than I can. It is possible, for example, that the acceleration was non uniform from the -4.6 second point to impact. In other words nearly all the acceleration may have occurred in say, the last two seconds to impact. In which case, the impact velocity would have been higher than the 7.4 mph calculated above.
ing period of 4.0 seconds. However, the distance moved as determined from the video record is approximately 25 ft. in 2.7 secs. The EDR data appears to overestimate the distance covered in the UA incident by a factor of about 4.
If the distance were covered in 2.7 seconds, as the video indicates, the average velocity would be 9.3 ft./sec. Assuming uniform acceleration, the peak velocity at impact would be twice the average velocity = 18.6 ft./sec or 12.7 mph. This is significantly less than the EDR assertion of a 29.8 mph speed one second before the impact and a 22.4 mph impact speed. The calculated acceleration from the video over a 2.7 second period is 6.9 ft. sec 2 (0.21g). This is considerably less than the quoted maximum acceleration of a Highlander of 0.36g.
The correlation between the video record and the EDR record for UA2 is questionable for the following additional reasons:
• -4.0 seconds: The vehicle is still moving backwards.
However, the EDR record claims a forward vehicle speed of 8.7 mph
• -3.0 seconds: the vehicle is more or less stationary with the front wheels rotating forwards and side -slipping to VOLUME 2, 2014
• -1.0 seconds: The Bosch EDR readout claims an increase in speed from 17.4 to 29.8 mph between -2.0 and -1.0 seconds. This is a claimed speed change of 12.4 mph in 1 second or an acceleration of 0.57g. Such a postulated acceleration is 58% greater than the maximum acceleration quoted for a Toyota Highlander.
For both UA1 and UA2 the video record and the EDR record do not appear to correlate in any way whatsoever. This lack of correlation demonstrates, in the author's opinion, that EDR records, as currently constituted, do not necessarily provide any useful information concerning a sudden acceler-ation incident. It is possible that the discrepancy between the speeds calculated from the video and from the EDR record indicate the presence of false speed signals that were then recorded.
The EDR records do not appear to be self-consistent. In the author's opinion, the most likely explanation is that the engine control computer software has suffered from some kind of temporary upset, the result of which is seen in the EDR results which do not appear to reflect either the UA1 or UA2 scenarios.
Although the brake lights do not appear to come on, it is quite clear from the video that individual wheels are locking up at certain stages in the incident, which suggests that either the driver was braking or else that the automatic stability system was coming into operation inappropriately and perhaps destabilizing the vehicle.
It is interesting to note that this particular vehicle was fitted with a brake override system which, self-evidently, does not appear to have worked.
There is a big discrepancy between the vehicle speed established from the video and the apparent vehicle speed derived from the vehicle speed sensor. One possible explanation for the very evident discrepancy is that for some undetermined reason, perhaps because of a poor electrical contact subject to mechanical vibration, a false speed signal has been generated. 
APPENDIX IV
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON ELECTRICAL CONTACTS AND INTERMITTENCY
[see also PART IV -ELECTRICAL INTERMITTENCIES IN THE AUTOMOBILE]
''Professor Hughes is rightly regarded as the real discoverer of the electrical behaviour of a bad joint or loose contact, the study of which in his hands has given us the microphone.'' Fahie [20] .
Contemporary accounts of Professor David Hughes' microphone demonstrations to the Royal Society of London (1878)] [21] illustrate how an electrical contact can be extremely sensitive to disturbance by vibration and how it can, under the right circumstances, modulate an electric current very effectively at audio frequencies. Edison's carbon microphone [22] , widely used as a telephone transmitter until the 1980s, similarly exploited the microphonic effect, this time of carbon granules placed between a metallic diaphragm and a metal back plate. Bearing these two examples of microphonic amplification in mind, the possibilities of an intermittent electrical contact in an automobile speed sensor being sensitive to audio frequency vibration and generating therefrom a false speed signal should not be altogether surprising.
Electrical contacts have always been difficult to make and to maintain. Over the years there have been enormous developments in the art and science of making reliable electrical connections and reducing the likelihood of intermittencies, see ASTM [23] , Holm [24] , Fairweather [25] LlewellynJones [26] , Slade [27] and Braunovic [28] .
Nevertheless, the reliability of electrical contacts should never be taken for granted. As Slade says [29] : ''The reliability of the electrical contact has also been an essential, but often ignored, factor -ignored, that is, until it fails. . . .'' Connectors and wiring for electromagnetic systems in aircraft, industrial plant and automobiles often operate in the presence of high levels of humidity, pollution, vibration and shock and are therefore liable to fail. Inadequate sealing against moisture, insufficient contact forces on connector pins, or a failure to specify matching materials for connector pins and female receptacles may contribute to fretting corrosion 21 that, in turn, may result in contact intermittencies developing over time that have a deleterious effect on system performance. Even the use of gold-plated contacts provides no absolute guarantee against fretting if the flashing is of insufficient thickness [30] , [31] . Fretting corrosion between tin plated electrical connector pins and gold-plated sockets on the F16 fly-by-wire fighter aircraft may have resulted in numerous un-commanded fuel shut-offs and may have been implicated in at least five crashes [32] .
NASA recommends the supply of power to electronic assemblies during vibration, acoustics and pyroshock testing, and the monitoring of electrical functions continuously while the excitation is applied [33] . In the aviation industry neural network technology is now being used to monitor and identify multiple intermittencies in aircraft wiring harnesses [34] .
In the automobile industry there does not yet appear to be the equivalent attention paid to testing for electrical intermittencies. Pecht et al (2002) [35] report the 'TroubleNot-Identified' phenomenon 22 in automobile electronics that ''can range from being critical to the customer's safety to being a mere nuisance.'' However, Pecht and his co-workers at the Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering, University of Maryland (CALCE), have not let matters rest 21 Fretting corrosion: Normally the conducting metallic surfaces that comprise a pair of electrical contacts are covered with a thin layer of metallic oxide that is non-conductive or semi-conductive. Metallic contact is made when the insulating oxide layers are pushed aside by pressing the contact surfaces together allowing direct metal-to-metal contact at a few microscopic points over a much smaller area than the apparent mechanical contact area. If the contact force should decrease this may result in a reduction in the area of contact and an increase in contact resistance. If the contacts experience vibration or heat cycling, microscopic relative movement may take place between contact surfaces that causes fretting of the oxide layer, exposing the underlying metal to the atmosphere and further oxidation. This results in a build-up of loose oxide particles in the hollows between the contact surfaces and this contributes to the development of electrical intermittency. 22 Leidecker (2011) [38] found that a short induced by a tin whisker was responsible for the failure of an acceleration position sensor in a 2003 Camry. Elviz and Pecht (2013) [39] found tin whisker formation in an engine ECU that they examined. The NASA Tin whisker website [40] has assembled a considerable literature on tin whisker failures.
Much workshop fault finding in the automobile industry takes little account of the elusive nature of intermittent faults and is based upon the somewhat ad hoc ''wiggling'' of conductors and connectors in the hopes of finding them. 24 Unfortunately this process tends to dislodge fretting products and may restore faulty electrical contacts to a temporarily healthy state. Disconnecting and reconnecting suspect connectors, or replacing electronic modules, may have a similar effect.
B. GROUNDING AND BATTERY INTERMITTENCIES
In automobiles, the vehicle body provides the ground return paths for most electrical and electronic systems and some sensors. High and intermittent ground resistances can cause noisy sensor and erroneous logic signals. Ground connections are particularly susceptible to corrosion and rising resistance over time because of moisture and road salt ingress, especially if the grounding bolts are not torqued up properly during assembly, Lewis [40] . High battery terminal contact resistances and intermittencies in particular can cause serious problems with vehicle electrical system voltage regulation [41] . 23 Tin whiskers are much thinner that a human hair, are difficult to detect and create intermittent short circuits. 24 An example of a formalized wiggle test from a vehicle manufacturer's workshop manual can be found at: http://ww2.justanswer.com/uploads/erc53/2010-03-27_014814_ pull_codes.pdf Suspect wiring harnesses and connectors are wiggled firstly with the ignition on and the engine off and then with the ignition on and the engine on and any diagnostic trouble codes that are generated relating to the circuitry in which an intermittent fault is suspected are recorded.
C. CONNECTOR INTERMITTENCIES
There is a multitude of electrical connectors in the modern automobile, each with a pair of vulnerable electrical contacts. For example an engine ECU may have upwards of 50 connectors. Designers in the automobile industry carry out exhaustive Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on components, sub-systems and systems and use this as a basis for the design of fault detection software. Some manufacturers carry out a 'PIN FMEA' for each electronic control unit and its associated wiring harness that lists the potential failure modes of the circuit connected to each pin and the possible resultant effects in terms of system performance. In the case of sensors, the 'PIN FMEA' covers the failure modes of the entire sensor loop. This useful approach to identifying potential problems is deficient in two respects:
1) The failure modes are identified and treated ''one at a time'', whereas in practice, as far as multi-pin connectors are concerned, common mode failures affecting several pins may occur more or less simultaneously. For example, although the likelihood of two sensors failing simultaneously may appear to be very small, should a multi-pin ECU connector come loose, the likelihood that several sensor circuits may be simultaneously become intermittent is quite high.
2) The FMEA method as presently implemented does not sufficiently recognise and deal with short duration dynamic intermittent faults. Faults are considered as if they will be open or short circuits and the intermediate situation where there are short duration intermittencies are not taken sufficiently into account. Intermittent contact faults in low-current sensor circuits excited by mechanical vibration will make a circuit noisy but, since the average circuit parameters may still remain within the bounds of what is deemed ''normal'', Electronic Control Unit (ECU) software designed to detect hard faults will not necessarily trigger diagnostic trouble codes (DTCs).
There are a number of possible ways in which more than one pin in a multi-pin connector may become intermittent at the same time. Fig. A5-2 . shows damage to a number of male pins from a 36 pin connector for an automobile control system ECU.
In this instance, each pin was gold plated on nickel, but the low contact resistance gold was not thick enough to withstand the vibration for long without wearing down to the nickel, at which point the contact resistance would be expected to rise. Most pins show longitudinal abrasion marks probably caused by insertion/removal from the female half of the connector and some show signs of cross-fretting probably caused by vibration. The ringed pin in the bottom row shows significant signs of fretting that, in this case, close to the white arrow, was clearly visible to the naked eye. In many cases, fretting and/or micro-arcing in connectors is difficult to find by in-situ visual inspection because it occurs on such a miniature scale that it may only be confirmed by removing the pin and/or the receptacle from the connector and examining under a high-powered optical or scanning electron microscope. Such destructive examination is extremely expensive and is only likely to be carried out in exceptional circumstances and certainly not in the car dealer's maintenance workshop. For this particular pin a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) analysis was later carried out that confirmed the presence of micro-globules of melted gold, which can be taken as taken as evidence of micro-arcing.
D. WIRING INTERMITTENCIES
Wiring intermittencies may occur in service because of vibration and fatigue of conductor strands, or as a result of damage during maintenance or repair. Intermittency may be difficult to detect if the fault lies within the wiring harness. Even where intermittency develops in a visible location it may still be hidden by the insulation. Ip and Tang [42] have studied the effect of flexing on motor multi-strand flexible cables and have shown that the broken strands form lapped surfaces that allow the passage of current. Because of relative motion the lapped surfaces are constantly formed, welded, oxidized and destroyed. In their view, this is very similar to the fretting corrosion that occurs at other kinds of electrical contact. In the case of a sensor loop, intermittency would be an intermediate stage in fault development. Eventually, all electrical contact between broken conductor strands would be lost and the loop would become permanently open circuit. Only once a full open circuit occurred would the electronic fault diagnosis system be likely to record a fault code.
Occasionally a wiring intermittency in the making may be visible, as in Fig. A5-3 . This shows the wire connections to an automobile speed sensor. The red signal wire appears to be intact and shows no sign of physical damage. The ground wire, to the left and passing behind the signal wire, has a sharp kink in it close to the sensor and looks as if it is a state of incipient failure, but has not yet failed. The exposed ends of several fractured strands appear to have broken through the insulation. This suggests that at some stage during the vehicle's life the wire became bent, or twisted, causing local work hardening of some copper conductor strands. Subsequent long-term vibration may then have caused fatigue and eventually fracture, strand by strand, accompanied by puncturing of the insulation by the broken ends of somestrands. It is reasonable to assume that, given time, the remaining strands would also have broken, creating first intermittency and then an open circuit. The damage was photographed at an intermediate stage while part of the insulation still provided some support.
This vehicle had been in an accident, but damage to the sensor ground cable was the only damage of any kind to components or wiring observed in this area of the vehicle. Bearing in mind the closeness of the ground wire to the undamaged signal wire, this suggests that the incipient fault had developed before the accident as a result of fatigue and was not the result of the accident.
E. PRINTED CIRCUIT INTERMITTENCIES
Fig. A5-4B shows that the PCB is supported at its left end by the 8 spring cantilever connector extensions that link the backs of the male connector pins to the printed circuit board. This makes for cheap assembly, but has allows vibration to pass from the wiring harness to the female receptacles and via the male pins and connection pin extensions to the printed circuit board. Because the connector pins are a loose fit in the connector housing, there is a limited freedom of rotation between the PCB and the connector back plate of approximately 2 degrees. Consequently wiring harness vibration may cause the board to vibrate as a cantilever pivoting about its left hand end. The switching transistor far left, also shown in Fig. 17 , touches the connector back plate when the angle between back plate and board decreases from 90 to 88 degrees. and was aligned with the direction of a potential line of vibratory contact between the left hand corner of the switching transistor and the connector back plate. The dust was easily removed with a light touch with a piece of adhesive paper. The above facts suggest that the transistor may have been vibrating against the back plate at some stage during the life of the vehicle. The grey mark serves as a fortuitous recorder of board vibration.
Fig . A5-6 shows two semi-circular cracks and a fissure in the solder in one of the main connections on the other side of the same PCB. Similar cracks were observed at other solder joint connections. These cracks are quite possibly the result of a combination of poor soldering and fatigue caused by board vibration. 25 Clearly there is a possibility that, with time, these cracks might have developed into intermittencies. The cracks, because they affect a number of solder joints, suggest the possibility that either thermal expansion and/or mechanical vibration transmitted via the wiring harness could cause multiple intermittencies on the inputs/outputs of a PCB more or less simultaneously. Fig. A5-7 shows a close up of a black foam pad, attached to the right hand edge of the PCB that seems to have been jammed into the narrow slot in the end casing that supports the right end of the PCB. Similar pads have been found by the author on other units and appear to be there to damp out board vibration. 26 Fig . A5-8 shows the 6 connecting pins on an accelerator pedal position sensor PCB. The conformal coating around each of the six pins appears to have fractured in similar patterns of semi-circular and radial cracks, possibly but not 25 Other score marks on the solder may have been caused by an instrument probe when the board was being examined. 26 The presence of similar pads on two other similar ECUs, suggests that this was an ad hoc modification introduced after the unit had entered production to damp board vibration and was not an original design feature. electrical tracking and dendrites between pins and eventually result in simultaneous intermittent short circuits between pins if there were significant differential voltages present.
